Checklist
Anti-IRGC Online Checklist
A defensive quick guide for spotting IRGC-aligned manipulation online. Use it to recognize patterns, keep discussions evidence-based, and avoid amplifying coordinated influence ops.
Focus: awareness and source-checking—not harassment or brigading.
Common tactics
- Impersonation of journalists, activists, or NGOs to seed confusion.
- "Both-sides" narratives that equate regime violence with opposition activity.
- Opposition-splitting threads that pit diaspora groups against each other.
- Repeated talking points (sanctions hurting people, protests foreign-made) recycled across accounts.
- Source laundering: fringe Telegram posts pushed into mainstream replies.
- Sudden bursts of identical posts immediately after major regime setbacks.
Red flags
- Brand-new accounts with recycled avatars or no personal history.
- Copy-paste language that appears across multiple handles within minutes.
- Circular citations where every link points back to the same anonymous channel.
- Emotional baiting (insults, outrage prompts) intended to derail substantive discussion.
- Constant derailment or whataboutism whenever abuses are documented.
What to do
- Verify every claim with an on-record source before amplifying it.
- Cross-check major allegations across languages (Farsi + English).
- Avoid quote-tweeting or screenshotting disinformation; document it privately instead.
- Track patterns in a secure note so you can share evidence with trusted researchers.
- Keep conversations grounded in specific events, dates, and outlets.
IRGC allied countries
Countries that support or cooperate with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Major arms supplier, joint military exercises, economic partnerships.
Largest trading partner, Belt and Road investments, UN Security Council support.
Strategic ally, hosts IRGC forces, proxy coordination.
Weapons technology exchange, ballistic missile cooperation.
Oil cooperation, anti-Western alliance.
Defense cooperation, sanctions evasion.
IRGC embeds advisers within Popular Mobilization Forces and bankrolls energy deals with Baghdad.
Quds Force funding for Hezbollah secures political influence in Beirut and access to eastern Mediterranean ports.
IRGC ships missiles, drones, and trainers to Ansar Allah, extending Iran's reach to the Red Sea.
IRGC-funded terror groups
Organizations funded and armed by Iran’s Quds Force.
Primary proxy force. Advanced weaponry, anti-ship missiles. Arsenal replenishment ongoing after 2024 Israel conflict.
Palestinian militant group. Rockets, tunnel networks, military training provided by IRGC Quds Force.
Smaller but active militant group. Iranian weapons and operational guidance.
Advanced arms shipments intercepted 2025: 750 tons including anti-ship missiles, drones, components with Farsi manuals.
Multiple groups including Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. Transport corridor for Hezbollah weapons.
Afghan Fatemiyoun, Pakistani Zainabiyoun brigades. IRGC training and command.
Elite PMF unit receiving IRGC rockets and drones used against U.S. and coalition sites.
Iran-backed militia running extortion rackets and rocket attacks in Baghdad's Green Zone.
IRGC-recruited Afghan fighters deployed to Syria with promises of cash and residency.
Source: U.S. State Department, Congressional Research Service, international arms seizures (2025-2026).
IRGC reach in Europe
Recent law-enforcement cases showing how Tehran’s repression and influence operations spill into European cities.
Foxtrot gang attacks in Stockholm and Uppsala have been orchestrated remotely by leaders hiding in Iran, highlighting how Tehran shelters actors destabilizing European cities.
Influence channels- Criminal funding
IRGC-aligned fixers provide safe passage and laundering channels for Foxtrot revenues, letting the gang pay shooters and bomb makers from Tehran.
- Operational sanctuary
Gang boss Rawa Majid is believed to move freely between Tehran and Karaj while directing car bombings and extortion schemes back in Sweden.
- Arms brokerage
Police seizures in 2025 tied pistols and explosives used in Swedish hits to shipments routed through IRGC-controlled networks in Turkey and the Caucasus.
Select a country to review documented influence channels and cases.
Method note
Patterns are derived from public threat briefings and community reports. Always weigh context, corroborate with reputable outlets, and rely on your judgment before labeling an account as hostile.